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Binding the Will: george eliot and  
the Practice of Promising
BY melissa J. ganZ
scholars have long noted george eliot’s interest in the nature and 
limits of the human will, but they have paid little attention to her treat-
ment of the practice of promising.1 in The Mill on the Floss (1860), 
Middlemarch (1871–1872), and Daniel Deronda (1876), promises 
give rise to repeated conflicts and misunderstandings, crystallizing 
the tension between freedom and obligation that runs through eliot’s 
work. the disputes typically occur in one of two ways. egoists such 
as tom tulliver and edward casaubon attempt to pressure others 
into making promises that require them to act in self-defeating ways. 
individuals such as stephen guest, rosamond Vincy, and gwendolen 
harleth, by contrast, refuse to honor their own commitments, evincing 
a complete disregard for the ways in which other people construe their 
words and actions. Underlying both of these problems is a profound 
abuse of will and an unwillingness to consider other people’s feelings 
and perspectives.
outside the world of eliot’s novels, moral philosophers, jurists, and 
social thinkers devoted considerable attention to the conflict between 
the individual will and the claims of others in the formation and in-
terpretation of promises. Philosophers had been debating the nature 
and source of promissory obligations since at least the seventeenth 
century. natural law thinkers such as hugo grotius, samuel Pufendorf, 
thomas hobbes, and John locke considered promises to be naturally 
binding; in their view, promises derived their force from people’s wills 
and intentions. in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
however, philosophers’ ideas about promises began to change. Utilitar-
ian thinkers such as William Paley and John austin now located the 
source of promissory obligations in people’s expectations, privileging 
the reasonable interpretations of promisees over the actual intentions 
of promisors.2 
at about the same time, jurists began to consider the nature of prom-
issory obligations as they reformulated the law of contract. Whereas 
judges previously interpreted contracts in ways that affirmed communal 
understandings of fair exchange, now they sought to give effect only to 
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commitments that people freely and deliberately made. the new “will 
theory” of contract drew heavily upon natural law philosophy; accord-
ing to this theory, individual promises, wills, and intentions themselves 
gave rise to contractual obligations. Judges, in fact, began to speak of 
a contract as a “meeting of minds.”3 in practice, however, they found 
it very difficult to uncover the intentions of contracting parties. By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, most judges had come to embrace an 
objective approach to contractual interpretation, relying upon external 
manifestations of intention as did utilitarian philosophers.4 
in this essay, i read eliot’s treatment of promises in the context of 
these changing ideas about consensual obligations, shedding light on 
questions that were important in her own time and that remain of 
deep interest to philosophers and legal scholars today. in doing so, i 
contribute to a debate among literary critics about the nature of eliot’s 
ethical vision. a number of scholars have argued that eliot’s novels 
fail to sustain the ideal of sympathetic relationships that the texts 
ostensibly espouse. these critics highlight the ways in which egoism, 
gender relations, and the indeterminacy of language undermine the 
fellow-feeling that eliot seeks to promote.5 a close analysis of eliot’s 
treatment of promises, however, suggests her strong commitment to an 
intersubjective model of human relationships. like Paley, austin, and 
henry sidgwick, and like a growing number of jurists in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, eliot embraces an expansive conception 
of promises: she suggests that one becomes bound by a promise 
whenever one knowingly excites another’s expectations concerning 
the existence of an obligation, even though one does not intend to 
become bound. the willingness to abide by implicit promises and to 
honor the expectations that one raises in other minds is a crucial test 
of moral character in eliot’s fiction. at the heart of this definition of 
promises lies eliot’s belief in the importance of attending to the ways 
in which one’s words and actions affect other people. 
although eliot privileges external manifestations of intention over 
actual intentions in assessing promissory responsibility, she remains 
committed to the notion that a meeting of minds ought, ideally, to 
form the basis of agreements and exchanges. as a practical matter, 
that is, she recognizes the difficulty of discerning others’ intentions, 
and she shows the need to honor the expectations that one knowingly 
creates in other minds; but she holds out the possibility that people 
may achieve a real blending of wills and desires. eliot articulates this 
utopian vision of promising in the Jewish plot of her final novel. in the 
religious visionary mordecai cohen’s relationship with the eponymous 
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daniel deronda, she imagines a meeting of minds, highlighting the 
ways in which promises can both reflect and promote understanding 
between people. she acknowledges, though, that such a mingling of 
ideas and intentions is, in the world of nineteenth-century england, 
limited to men. 
i.
By the late eighteenth century, promises had come to play a crucial 
role in many areas of social life, from commercial exchanges to conjugal 
relations. in all of these areas, they raised pressing questions about the 
nature of intention, interpretation, and obligation. the questions arose 
most persistently, however, in the law courts. Jurists found themselves 
grappling with the ethical and epistemological implications of the 
practice of promising as they developed a new theory of contract.
in the equitable model of contract that prevailed in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the individual will played a fairly small role. 
then, as today, courts held people accountable for the performance of 
their promises only when there was some reason or motivating circum-
stance for the promise, such as payment or other concrete benefit. in 
the law’s terminology, a promise had to be accompanied by “consid-
eration” in order to give rise to a legal obligation.6 When judges and 
juries decided contract disputes during this period, they investigated 
both whether there was a promise and whether the consideration 
given in exchange for it was adequate. the consideration provided the 
primary grounds for the obligation; if juries found the consideration 
to be insufficient, they could refuse to enforce the agreement. early 
contract law thus left an opening for judicial discretion and communal 
standards of fairness that imposed severe constraints on the kinds of 
contractual relations that individuals could form.7
in the last few decades of the eighteenth century, jurists began to 
replace this equitable theory of contract with a new theory grounded 
in principles of individual freedom and autonomy.8 according to this 
theory, obligations arose less from the existence of consideration and 
more from the sheer will of the contracting parties. William murray, 
lord mansfield played a central role in developing the new doctrine. 
during his tenure as chief Justice of the court of King’s Bench from 
1756 to 1788, mansfield issued several controversial rulings about the 
role of promises in commercial contracts. most famously, in Pillans and 
Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins (1765), he declared that in commercial 
cases among merchants, written promises could create legally binding 
obligations without any accompanying consideration. he explained that 
568 George Eliot and the Practice of Promising
“the ancient notion about the [need for] consideration was for the sake 
of evidence only,” and that when a promise was reduced to writing, 
“there was no objection to the want of consideration.”9 although judges 
later rejected mansfield’s extreme approach, they embraced the idea 
that the basis of contractual liability is the intentions of the parties and 
that the consideration serves primarily as evidence of those intentions.10 
over the course of the next hundred years, judges elaborated and de-
veloped this idea as they formulated the classical law of contract. the 
principles of the marketplace provided the model for this new body of 
law. When courts decided disputes between contracting parties, they 
refused to consider the justice of the exchanges and refused to alter 
the terms upon which the parties had agreed. their role, they insisted, 
was to enforce individual wills and intentions rather than communal 
standards of fairness. instead of scrutinizing a contract to determine 
whether there was adequate consideration, judges now looked only 
to see that there was a meeting of minds.11
courts, however, quickly found themselves struggling with the dif-
ficult task of discerning subjective intent. By the middle of the nine-
teenth century, most judges had given up the effort and had adopted 
an objective approach to contractual interpretation. although judges 
continued to view the subjective intentions of the parties as the legiti-
mating basis for contractual obligations, they relied now upon objective 
measures of those intentions.12 much as moral philosophers such as 
david hume and Paley had insisted, courts held that an individual 
could not avoid a duty that would otherwise attach to an external 
manifestation of intention by pointing to some secret reservation. in 
cases where the existence or interpretation of a contract was unclear, 
judges evaluated only the parties’ words and actions.13 
on occasion, as in the controversial case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus 
(1864), courts relied upon the subjective meeting of minds standard to 
resolve contract disputes, invalidating contracts when parties did not 
understand key terms of the agreement in precisely the same way.14 
some treatise writers, such as sir frederick Pollock, also remained 
committed to the subjective approach, insisting upon the importance 
of a true consensus theory of liability. in Principles of Contract at Law 
and in Equity (1876), for example, Pollock explained that contracting 
parties “must be assured by mutual communication that a common 
intention exists, that they mean the same thing in the same sense.”15 
in a series of lectures and essays in the 1880s and 1890s, however, 
the american jurist and philosopher oliver Wendell holmes, Jr. dealt 
the subjective approach a final blow. “[anglo-american contract] law has 
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nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’ minds,” he famously 
declared in The Common Law (1881). “in contract, as elsewhere, it 
must go by externals and judge parties by their conduct.”16 in holmes’s 
view, subjective motivation was legally irrelevant; external behavior 
trumped actual intentions and inner states of mind. holmes elaborated 
in “the Path of the law” (1897):
morals deal with the actual internal state of the individual’s mind, what 
he actually intends. from the time of the romans down to now, this 
mode of dealing has affected the language of the law as to contract, 
and the language used has reacted upon the thought. We talk about 
a contract as a meeting of the minds of the parties, and thence it is 
inferred in various cases that there is no contract because their minds 
have not met; that is, because they have intended different things 
or because one party has not known of the assent of the other. Yet 
nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a contract 
to things which neither of them intended, and when one does not know 
of the other’s assent. . . . in my opinion no one will understand the 
true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental 
questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are 
formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement 
of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of 
external signs,—not on the parties’ having meant the same thing but 
on their having said the same thing.17
holmes’s account of contract law is both descriptive and prescriptive: 
he not only reminds jurists that courts have been using an objective 
approach to contractual interpretation for some time; he also insists 
that they continue to use this approach. Underlying holmes’s objection 
to the idea of contract as a meeting of minds was a broader critique 
of the way in which legal thinkers and laypeople alike “confound[ed] 
morality with law.”18 a positivist, holmes sought to keep ethics and 
law—as well as promises and contracts—separate. in his view, there 
was nothing morally significant about a contract; everyone had the 
right “to break [a] contract if he [chose],” as long as he paid damages 
to the other party for the breach.19 holmes’s critique of the subjective 
approach to contractual interpretation, though, ironically contributed 
to the development of a doctrine that fostered accountability in con-
tractual relations. By the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
english and american courts had abandoned the attempt to discern 
the actual intentions of parties in contract disputes. as a result, they 
often undermined, rather than facilitated, the wishes of contracting 
parties. Judges held people responsible for what they appeared to be 
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saying and doing, rather than for what they actually meant to say or 
do, and they considered what reasonable people would say or do if 
they were in the same situation as the contracting parties. the formal, 
external approach to contractual interpretation continues to underlie 
anglo-american law today.20
ii. 
While nineteenth-century jurists worked out rules governing the 
formation and interpretation of contracts, a diverse group of writers 
and thinkers considered the implications of the proliferation of con-
sensual agreements in society. the legal historian sir henry sumner 
maine offered one of the most optimistic accounts of this change. 
in his influential study, Ancient Law (1861), maine traced a gradual 
expansion of individual freedom in roman civilization, as reflected 
and furthered by an evolution in the law governing private obliga-
tions. Whereas responsibilities initially originated in the family, he 
explained, individually negotiated promises and contracts eventually 
came to form the basis of most social relations. this change in roman 
law, according to maine, had far-reaching effects on Western culture. 
in his famous phrase, “the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”21
the sociologist and apostle of Victorian liberalism herbert spencer 
shared maine’s conviction that this shift signified moral and social 
improvement, but other observers were less optimistic.22 social crit-
ics such as John ruskin and thomas carlyle and novelists such as 
charles dickens considered the growth of market culture and the 
accompanying expansion of the autonomous will as cause for alarm. 
rather than celebrate the new opportunities for human agency, they 
criticized the market’s tendency to encourage impulsive, self-interested 
behavior and they denounced the lack of constraints that society im-
posed on the individual will.23 in a period when many people thought 
nothing of breaking their promises and contracts, critics worried that 
consensual ties were too fragile to serve as structures for lasting so-
cial relations. in Our Mutual Friend (1864–1865), dickens’s cynical 
barrister eugene Wrayburn expresses the spirit of the age when he 
wryly observes that “people’s breaking promises and contracts and 
bargains of all sorts, makes good for [his] trade.”24 in eugene’s view, 
breaches are not only routine; they are also desirable. the breaking 
of agreements in the text serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of 
the era’s individualistic ethos.
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eliot shared these concerns. like dickens, she was keenly interested 
in the growth of contract and the practice of promising. in fact, she  read 
maine’s Ancient Law between 17 november and 1 december 1869, 
and included summaries of each chapter of the work in a notebook 
that she kept as she began writing Middlemarch.25 in the late 1860s 
and 1870s, she also conversed with and read the work of philosophers 
such as austin and sidgwick, who made important contributions to 
the fields of analytical jurisprudence and the philosophy of mind, and 
who considered, among other topics, the ethics of promising.26 eliot’s 
interest in moral and epistemological questions concerning promises 
and contracts is also evident, though, a decade earlier, in The Mill on 
the Floss.
set in the early years of the nineteenth century, The Mill on the 
Floss depicts the growth of the market in general and the proliferation 
of contractual agreements in particular. from the promissory note 
that mr. tulliver gives his brother-in-law and the loan that mrs. glegg 
gives mr. tulliver, to the mortgage that mr. tulliver takes out on his 
mill and the bill of sale that he gives an impatient creditor, contracts 
form the basis of commercial relations in this novel. But eliot is most 
concerned with promises that arise outside the sphere of the market. 
through maggie tulliver’s relations with her father and brother as well 
as with Philip Wakem and stephen guest, eliot explores two different 
views of the nature and purpose of promising—a narrow, self-regarding 
view, embraced by mr. tulliver and tom, and an expansive, other-re-
garding view, espoused by maggie. although eliot acknowledges the 
costs of the expansive approach, she ultimately affirms it. she suggests 
that the basis for promissory liability lies in the expectations that one 
raises in other minds, and that such expectations trump one’s actual 
intentions.
in the face of bewildering social change and economic loss, the 
hapless mr. tulliver uses promises to impose his will on others and to 
ensure that they act according to his wishes. When mr. Wakem obtains 
possession of the tullivers’ beloved mill, mr. tulliver becomes dis-
traught; he declares his everlasting hatred for the lawyer and demands 
that his son swear that he, too, will never forgive the man:
i won’t forgive him! . . . and you mind this, tom—you never forgive 
him, neither, if you mean to be my son. there’ll maybe come a time 
when you may make him feel—it’ll never come to me—i’n got my 
head under the yoke. now write—write it i’ the Bible.27 
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maggie is horrified at the vindictive spirit that underlies her father’s 
request. “it’s wicked to curse and bear malice,” she exclaims, in an at-
tempt to prevent the recording of this pledge. But mr. tulliver remains 
firm. “[W]rite—write as you’ll remember what Wakem’s done to your 
father,” he commands his son, “and you’ll make him and his feel it, if 
ever the day comes. and sign your name thomas tulliver” (MF, 236). 
By insisting that tom inscribe this pledge in the Bible, mr. tulliver 
seeks to give it formal, religious sanction; he asks tom, in effect, not 
only to promise him but also to promise god. tom’s willingness to 
comply with this request eases mr. tulliver’s mind. he takes comfort 
in knowing that, although he is unable to obtain revenge, his son may 
do so for him. the pledge thus serves to lessen his feeling of defeat 
and to bolster his sense of control over others.
like his father, tom uses promises to assert his will and to perpetu-
ate conflict. Upon discovering that maggie has secretly been meeting 
Wakem’s son Philip alone in the red deeps, he demands that she 
promise never to see Philip again: 
now, then, maggie, there are but two courses for you to take; either 
you vow solemnly to me, with your hand on my father’s Bible, that 
you will never have another meeting or speak another word in private 
with Philip Wakem, or you refuse, and i tell my father everything[.] 
(MF, 300) 
tom’s request here echoes to that of his father. like mr. tulliver, 
tom uses the Bible to shore up a pledge; he asks maggie not only to 
promise him but also to vow to god that she will never again meet 
Philip in private. But where tom willingly complies with his father’s 
request, maggie resents her brother’s attempt to restrict her actions. 
she agrees to “promise . . . to give up all intercourse with Philip” but 
insists that tom permit her either to see Philip one last time or to 
write to him so that she can explain the prohibition (MF, 300). Unlike 
her brother and father, moreover, she insists on the binding nature of 
a bare verbal promise. “if i give you my word, that will be as strong a 
bond to me as if i laid my hand on the Bible,” she explains. “i don’t 
require that to bind me.” tom insists on this condition, however: 
“do what I require,” he orders. “i can’t trust you, maggie. there is 
no consistency in you” (MF, 300). maggie submits to tom’s demand 
and lays her hand on the Bible, for she feels that she has no choice in 
the matter: tom is more powerful than she is and, in this instance, as 
in so many others, she is forced to submit to his will. she alters the 
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terms of the promise slightly, though: she gives her “word not to meet 
[Philip] or write to him again without [Tom’s] knowledge” (MF, 301; 
my emphasis). still, this restrictive promise compromises maggie’s 
happiness, for it prevents her from freely communicating with the 
one person in her narrow-minded society who shares her artistic, in-
tellectual, and emotional sensibilities. the pledge makes explicit the 
crushing conflict in maggie’s life between her loyalty to her father and 
brother and her affection for Philip. 
maggie’s understanding of the nature and purpose of promising 
differs sharply from that of mr. tulliver and tom. Whereas the latter 
think of promises as formal obligations that serve to perpetuate their 
wills, maggie possesses a broader conception of promises that includes 
all signs—written and spoken, witnessed and unwitnessed—that raise 
others’ expectations concerning the existence of binding commitments. 
eliot introduces this broader view of promises early on in the novel, 
when maggie first meets Philip as a young child. maggie admires 
Philip’s intellectual prowess and artistic talent, and pities his physical 
deformity. Before she leaves him, she kisses him and tells him, “i shall 
always remember you, and kiss you when i see you again, if it’s ever 
so long” (MF, 164). the narrator makes clear that maggie construes 
this declaration of her intended future conduct as a pledge. several 
years later, when she meets Philip again, the narrator explains that 
maggie “remember[s] her promise to kiss him, but, as a young lady 
who ha[s] been at a boarding-school, she [knows] now that such a 
greeting [is] out of the question, and Philip would not expect it” (MF, 
165). the narrator’s remark provides important insight into maggie’s 
ideas about the practice of promising—ideas that maggie will soon 
articulate herself.
When maggie next encounters Philip, their relationship becomes 
complicated by the escalation of the dispute between their fathers. 
during one of their first few meetings in the red deeps, Philip 
declares his love for maggie and reminds her of her promise to kiss 
him. maggie complies, but Philip notes that she does not seem happy. 
he fears that she has told him that she loves him simply out of pity. 
maggie responds:
it is all new and strange to me; but i don’t think i could love any one 
better than i love you. i should like always to live with you—to make 
you happy. i have always been happy when i have been with you. there 
is only one thing i will not do for your sake: i will never do anything to 
wound my father. You must never ask that from me. (MF, 294)
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maggie’s uncertain feelings for Philip (“i don’t think i could love any 
one better than i love you”) sharply contrast with her absolute devotion 
to her father (“i will never do anything to wound my father”). maggie’s 
hesitancy about their relationship troubles Philip. Before they part, he 
seeks to obtain a more specific commitment from her. her response, 
though, remains ambiguous:  
 “then my life will be filled with hope, maggie—and 
i shall be happier than other men, in spite of all? We do 
belong to each other—for always—whether we are apart or 
together?”
 “Yes, Philip: i should like never to part: i should like 
to make your life very happy.”
 “i am waiting for something else—i wonder whether 
it will come.”
 maggie smiled, with glistening tears, and then 
stooped her tall head to kiss the pale face that was full of 
pleading, timid love—like a woman’s. (MF, 294–95)
Whereas Philip expresses his wishes clearly and forcefully, maggie 
dodges his attempt to secure a definite obligation. rather than promise 
to marry him or assure him that she intends never to part from him, she 
articulates a series of desires concerning their relationship: “i should 
like always to live with you”; “i should like never to part”; “i should 
like to make your life very happy.” Philip himself notes the difference 
between maggie’s statements and the promise that he hopes to hear. 
But the kiss that maggie gives Philip at the end of this exchange at 
once evokes her earlier pledge and suggests further reason for Philip 
to believe that one day they might marry. 
several years later, after her father’s death, maggie meets Philip 
again, this time at the home of her cousin lucy deane. Philip asks 
maggie whether she wishes to forget their prior intimacy. “i desire no 
future that will break the ties of the past,” maggie replies. “But the tie 
to my brother is one of the strongest. i can do nothing willingly that 
will divide me always from him.” Philip inquires now, “with a desper-
ate determination to have a definite answer,” whether that is the only 
reason that would keep him apart from her forever. “the only reason,” 
maggie replies with “calm decision.” the narrator explains that, at this 
moment, maggie believes that her brother’s disapproval is, in fact, the 
only thing that separates them; when she answers Philip’s question, 
she “look[s] at the future with a sense of calm choice” (MF, 389). Yet, 
as the novel has made clear, maggie’s mind is hardly decided on this 
question; she is certain neither about her feelings for Philip nor her 
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intentions concerning marriage, for she finds herself growing attracted 
to stephen guest, her cousin lucy’s fiancé. 
through a series of heated exchanges between maggie and ste-
phen, eliot considers the question of whether maggie is bound by 
an implicit promise to marry Philip. the egotistical stephen attempts 
to persuade maggie to forget Philip and to marry him instead, for 
he cares more about indulging his present desires than honoring his 
prior obligations. maggie implores stephen to “[t]hink of lucy” (MF, 
392), adding that there are “other ties . . . even if lucy did not ex-
ist.” “i consider myself engaged to [Philip],” she explains, “—i don’t 
mean to marry any one else.” stephen responds by insisting that they 
are justified in reneging on unwanted vows: “maggie, if you loved me 
as i love you,” he implores, “we should throw everything else to the 
winds for the sake of belonging to each other. We should break all 
these mistaken ties that were made in blindness, and determine to 
marry each other” (MF, 393). in stephen’s view, he and maggie may 
dissolve these other ties because they made them before they met and 
fell in love. When this argument fails to convince maggie, stephen 
modifies his position and suggests that they are not really bound by 
any other ties in the first place: 
“[a]fter all,” he went on, in an impatient tone, trying to defeat his 
own scruples as well as hers, “i am breaking no positive engagement: 
if lucy’s affections had been withdrawn from me and given to some 
one else, i should have felt no right to assert a claim on her. if you 
are not absolutely pledged to Philip, we are neither of us bound.” 
(MF, 393–94)
here, as throughout the exchange, stephen raises important ques-
tions about the moral claims of explicit and implicit promises and the 
circumstances under which it is acceptable to break them, at least in 
the context of marriage.28 But maggie does not agree with stephen’s 
answers to these questions; in her view, both she and stephen are 
equally constrained, bound by prior commitments. “[t]he real tie lies 
in the feelings and expectations we have raised in other minds,” she 
insists. “else all pledges might be broken, when there [is] no outward 
penalty. there would be no such thing as faithfulness” (MF, 394).
through maggie’s disagreement with stephen, eliot intervenes in 
a discussion among philosophers and jurists about the nature and ex-
tent of promissory obligation. in their treatises and lectures, ethicists 
such as Paley, austin, and sidgwick examined the competing roles 
of intentions and expectations in promissory obligations and, as we 
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have seen, judges struggled with the question when deciding contract 
disputes. the philosophers—who shared a broadly utilitarian frame 
of mind—privileged the expectations of promisees over the actual 
intentions of promisors.29 in The Principles of Moral and Political 
Philosophy (1785), a copy of which eliot owned, Paley maintained 
that the obligation to honor promises “depends upon the expectations 
which we knowingly and voluntarily excite.”30 any action or conduct 
towards another person that, one is sensible, “excites expectations in 
that other,” he explained, “is as much a promise, and creates as strict 
an obligation, as the most express assurances.”31 austin, too, empha-
sized the importance of external manifestations of intention and the 
expectations that they raise in other minds, although he sought to shift 
the focus of the inquiry from the apprehension of the promisor to that 
of both parties.32 eliot’s friend sidgwick similarly made expectations 
the basis for his theory of promissory obligation. “[t]he essential ele-
ment of the duty of good faith seems to be not conformity to my 
own statement, but to the expectations that i have intentionally raised 
in others,” sidgwick would write in The Methods of Ethics (1874).33 
in order to determine whether a person would be obliged to satisfy 
expectations that he did not intend to create, sidgwick would explain, 
“[w]e form the conception of an average or normal man, and consider 
what expectations he would form under the circumstances, inferring 
this from the beliefs and expectations which men generally entertain 
under similar circumstances.”34 Jurists, we remember, were formulating 
similar rules in contract cases, albeit largely as a result of practical, as 
opposed to moral, considerations.
in viewing herself as bound by a tacit engagement to Philip, mag-
gie embraces the position articulated by Paley, austin, and sidgwick 
and adopted by most jurists in the middle of the century. maggie feels 
bound to Philip because she has raised his hopes that she may marry 
him, even though she is not certain in her own mind that she wishes 
to do so. although maggie succumbs to stephen’s temptation and 
permits him to carry her far down the river, alone in his boat, when 
she realizes what she has done, she insists that stephen take her back 
to shore. stephen declares that their situation proves that their feelings 
for each other cannot be overcome. maggie disagrees. “faithfulness 
and constancy mean something else besides doing what is easiest and 
pleasantest to ourselves,” she insists. “they mean renouncing whatever 
is opposed to the reliance others have in us. . . . i feel no excuse for 
myself—none. i should never have failed towards lucy and Philip as 
i have done, if i had not been weak, selfish, and hard—able to think 
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of their pain without a pain to myself that would have destroyed all 
temptation” (MF, 417). maggie here conflates her implicit promise to 
Philip with stephen’s explicit promise to lucy; in her mind, they are 
equally binding, for both Philip and lucy rely upon their constancy 
and suffer as a result of their infidelity. through maggie’s agonizing 
decision to renounce stephen and return to st. ogg’s, eliot under-
scores the costs involved in privileging Philip’s expectations over her 
own desires, even as she suggests that maggie is right to view herself 
as bound to Philip.35
eliot makes clear, though, that Philip ought to attend to maggie’s 
feelings and desires, just as she attends to his. after Philip learns of 
maggie’s aborted elopement with stephen, he begins imaginatively 
to place himself in maggie’s position and acknowledges his mistake 
in attempting to force her into an unwanted engagement. “let no 
self-reproach weigh on you because of me,” he writes to maggie, 
after she returns to st. ogg’s. “it is i who should rather reproach 
myself for having urged my feelings upon you, and hurried you into 
words that you have felt as fetters.” When she first came back, he 
explains, he shrank even from writing to her for fear of “thrust[ing]” 
himself on her and thus “repeating [his] original error” (MF, 440). 
Philip shows signs of an important change here. Unlike both tom 
and stephen, he acknowledges his egotism and shows concern for 
maggie’s needs. although he still affirms his love for her and declares 
that he is “unchangeably [hers],” he insists that he is hers “not with 
selfish wishes” (MF, 440, 441). in effect, he releases her from her 
promise. Philip’s letter, though, comes too late. maggie’s struggle to 
find a balance between her own will and others’ wishes leaves her 
emotionally drained.
eliot is unable to imagine a way out of this impasse. in the last few 
pages of the novel, she shifts her focus from these agonizing ethical 
questions concerning the formation and dissolution of promises to 
other equally troublesome issues concerning non-contractual, familial 
ties. throughout the text, maggie emphasizes her duty to her father 
and brother, reiterating her desire never to “break the ties of the past” 
(MF, 389). this Burkean nostalgia for the unbreakable bonds of pre-
modern society eventually replaces the novel’s concern with the ethical 
dilemmas created by voluntary obligations. in his passionate response 
to the destruction wrought by the french revolution, edmund Burke 
used the image of the entailed estate to signify the unbreakable ties 
between past and present generations.36 the feudal imagery evoked 
his longing for the period before the growth of contract—a period 
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marked by stability, constancy, and relative certainty in human re-
lationships. in many ways, eliot shares Burke’s view of the limits of 
contractual ties. she alludes to Burke’s work in book 4 of the novel, 
observing that “[t]he days of chivalry are not gone, notwithstanding 
Burke’s grand dirge over them,” and, in the final pages of the text, she 
imaginatively reconstructs maggie’s original bond with her brother (MF, 
250). maggie’s tragic death underscores eliot’s simultaneous invest-
ment in and critique of the indissoluble ties that structured social life 
in the pre-modern era. maggie’s desire to save tom from the flood 
ultimately causes her own demise, but eliot is not able in this novel 
to imagine a different solution to the problem of human relationships 
in modern contractual culture.
iii.
in Middlemarch, eliot revisits the ethics of promising, probing the 
ways in which promises crystallize the tension between the individual 
will and responsibilities to others. eliot, we remember, read maine’s 
Ancient Law in the fall of 1869 during the early stages of her work on 
this novel; maine’s ideas seem to have left a deep impression on her 
mind and her writing.37 she responds in this text with great ambiva-
lence to the changes that maine described. the egotism that pervades 
middlemarch society seriously complicates the practice of promising. 
like mr. tulliver and his son, edward casaubon and rosamond ly-
dgate attempt to use promises to impose their wills on others and to 
restrict others’ actions. rosamond refuses to limit her own freedom, 
though, by making pledges to other people. Unlike maggie, she fails to 
consider the expectations that she creates in other minds and refuses 
to acknowledge such expectations as binding. rosamond’s brother 
and parents, by contrast, confuse wishful thinking with legitimate ex-
pectations; they read their own desires into others’ words and actions 
and become convinced that others have bound themselves when the 
latter have given clear indications to the contrary. in spite of these 
problems, however, eliot ultimately affirms the value and importance 
of promissory obligations. through mary garth’s relationship with 
fred Vincy, she holds out hope that promises can provide the basis 
for strong human ties.
the difficulty of penetrating other minds becomes a central concern 
early on in this novel. although dorothea Brooke’s erudite husband 
edward casaubon cautions, “[w]e must not inquire too curiously into 
motives,” he is obsessed and confounded by his inability to discern 
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them.38 in an attempt to alleviate his anxiety about his wife’s feelings 
for his young cousin, the aptly named Will ladislaw, and in an effort 
to restrict dorothea’s freedom after he dies, casaubon asks her to 
bind herself with a promise. one night, dorothea awakens to find 
casaubon sitting in a chair, eager to talk to her. he explains that he 
has a “request to make”: “it is that you will let me know, deliberately, 
whether, in case of my death, you will carry out my wishes: whether 
you will avoid doing what i should deprecate, and apply yourself to do 
what i should desire” (M, 448, 448–49). dorothea struggles to decide 
how to respond to this unusual request: “‘no, i do not yet refuse,’ 
said dorothea, in a clear voice, the need of freedom asserting itself 
within her; ‘but it is too solemn—i think it is not right—to make a 
promise when i am ignorant what it will bind me to. Whatever af-
fection prompted i would do without promising.’” casaubon is not 
satisfied with this answer. “But you would use your own judgment,” 
he objects. “i ask you to obey mine; you refuse.” horrified at the 
thought of opposing her husband, dorothea pleads for more time so 
that she can “reflect a little while.” “i desire with my whole soul to 
do what will comfort you,” she tells casaubon, “but i cannot give any 
pledge suddenly—still less a pledge to do i know not what” (M, 449). 
the conflict between obeying her husband’s wishes and asserting her 
own will deeply troubles dorothea. she wishes to comply and yet she 
wonders whether he “might . . . not mean to demand something more 
from her than she had been able to imagine, since he wanted her to 
pledge to carry out his wishes without telling her exactly what they 
were” (M, 451). dorothea senses, though, that she will not be strong 
enough to resist and that she will eventually submit to her husband’s 
demand: “she simply felt that she was going to say ‘Yes’ to her own 
doom: she was too weak, too full of dread at the thought of inflicting 
a keen-edged blow on her husband, to do anything but submit com-
pletely” (M, 452). fortunately for dorothea, casaubon dies before 
she is able to give her word.
By killing casaubon before dorothea can submit to his will, eliot 
makes clear that an “indefinite promise of devotion to the dead” is too 
broad and exacting (M, 451). like tom tulliver, casaubon does not 
know what it means to trust another human being; hence, he attempts 
to control all of his wife’s future actions. the promise that casaubon 
seeks to secure from dorothea would leave her frozen in the past. after 
his death, dorothea acknowledges that this would have been the case. 
she places his unfinished “synoptical tabulation”—which he wanted 
her to complete—in a sealed envelope in her desk drawer, along with 
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a note. “I could not use it,” she writes to her dead husband. “Do you 
not see now that I could not submit my soul to yours, by working 
hopelessly at what I have no belief in?” (M, 506–7). in finally reject-
ing casaubon’s request that she bind herself to his wishes and carry 
out his fruitless work, dorothea frees herself from the restrictive hold 
of her husband’s “dead hand” (M, 403). Unlike maggie, who submits 
to her brother’s demands and binds herself with a promise that she 
does not wish to make, dorothea now asserts her own will. through 
casaubon’s death, eliot thus shows the importance of resisting others’ 
efforts completely to restrict one’s actions, highlighting the need to 
retain the freedom to shape one’s own future.
eliot suggests, however, that narrowly conceived promises can im-
prove relationships by fostering accountability and limiting boundless 
desire. Unlike dorothea, rosamond Vincy refuses to bind herself even 
when she ought to do so. instead, she repeatedly attempts to secure 
promises from other people. When her husband, tertius lydgate, 
discovers that she has gone horseback riding with his cousin, captain 
lydgate, even though she is pregnant, he orders her to refrain from 
riding again and declares that he will speak to his cousin about it. 
rosamond begs him not to talk to the captain. “it will be treating 
me as if i were a child,” she objects. “Promise that you will leave the 
subject to me.” as there “[does] seem to be some truth in her objec-
tion,” lydgate begrudgingly complies with her request, and “thus 
the discussion end[s] with his promising rosamond, and not with 
her promising him.”39 lydgate’s willingness to consider rosamond’s 
concern contrasts with her refusal to look at the situation from his 
point of view. rosamond, the narrator tells us, “[is] determined not to 
promise.” in her mind, what she “like[s] to do” is the “right thing” to 
do, and she directs all of her energy to “getting the means of doing it” 
(M, 549). her love of horseback riding itself, of course, points to her 
desire for freedom and mastery; her willingness to ride while she is 
pregnant suggests her insensitivity to the wellbeing of anyone besides 
herself. When she goes riding again, however, her horse takes fright 
at the crash of a tree, and the resulting accident leads to the loss of 
rosamond’s baby. the death of the unborn child vividly underscores 
the dangers that stem from her refusal to rein in her will.
not surprisingly, rosamond’s refusal to bind herself with promises 
also contributes to the deterioration of her marriage. rosamond be-
comes sullen and angry when lydgate tells her that they will need to 
cut back their expenses and move to a smaller house. rosamond, in 
fact, secretly contradicts lydgate’s instructions and tells the auctioneer 
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to take their house off of the market. not only does rosamond refuse 
to give her word to lydgate that she will never take such an action 
again in the future, but she asks him to promise her not to put the 
house back up for sale without telling her. “i think it is i who should 
exact a promise that you will do nothing without telling me,” lydgate 
rejoins (M, 621). When he discovers, shortly afterwards, that she has 
also secretly written to his uncle, asking for financial assistance on his 
behalf, he becomes furious: “can you not see . . . that nothing can be 
so fatal as a want of openness and confidence between us?” he asks 
her. “it has happened again and again that i have expressed a decided 
wish, and you have seemed to assent, yet after that you have secretly 
disobeyed my wish. in that way i can never know what i have to trust 
to” (M, 626). although lydgate does not treat rosamond as an equal 
partner in their relationship—he believes that it is “for [him] to judge” 
how they are to live, and for her simply to accept his decisions—he 
shows a much greater willingness to consider her perspective than she 
does his (M, 611). lydgate’s inability to discern his wife’s intentions or 
to rely upon her words and actions lies at the root of their disagree-
ments. When lydgate asks rosamond to tell him that he can depend 
upon her not acting secretly in the future, she replies that she “can-
not possibly make admissions or promises in answer to such words as 
[he] [has] used towards [her]” (M, 626). Unlike casaubon’s demand 
to dorothea, the novel suggests, lydgate’s plea to his wife is entirely 
reasonable. rosamond does not perceive the justness of lydgate’s 
request, for she refuses to step outside her own mental space and 
view the world through others’ eyes. rosamond repeatedly attempts 
to use promises to restrict lydgate’s actions even though, eliot shows, 
rosamond ought instead to rein in her own desire.
rosamond’s brother and parents evince a similar self-absorption. 
their unwillingness to consider other perspectives creates an additional 
problem concerning the practice of promising: they read into others’ 
words and actions promissory intentions when the latter are not war-
ranted, seeing what they wish to see and hearing what they want to 
hear. early on in the novel, a dispute arises when Peter featherstone 
hears a rumor that his nephew, rosamond’s indolent brother fred, 
has been “speculating” on his “expectations” from his wealthy uncle 
(M, 98). most people in middlemarch treat fred as if he is special 
because of his “tacit expectations” from featherstone, and fred’s 
parents are no exception (M, 220); they assume that featherstone 
will eventually leave his property to their son. mr. Vincy explains to 
his brother-in-law that featherstone “has as good as told fred he 
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means to leave him his land” (M, 119). mrs. Vincy calls it a “robbery” 
when featherstone subsequently fails to act as they all expect him 
to do. “[i]t was like giving him the land, to promise it,” she bitterly 
declares, “and what is promising, if making everybody believe is not 
promising?” (M, 322). 
in this account of fred’s anticipated inheritance, eliot revisits the 
question of the role of expectations in the formation of promissory 
obligations, although this time she examines the problem from the 
perspective of a potential promisee rather than a promisor. fred’s 
ideas about implied promises appear to be similar to those of maggie 
tulliver. maggie, we remember, insists that if people do not honor the 
“feelings and expectations [that they have] raised in other minds . . . 
all pledges might be broken” (MF, 394). Yet, whereas maggie consid-
ers how Philip construes her words and actions, fred never removes 
his metaphorical blinders. fred should know better; when he brings 
featherstone a letter written by the banker, nicholas Bulstrode, stat-
ing the latter’s conviction that fred “has not obtained any advance of 
money on bequests promised by Mr. Featherstone,” featherstone bursts 
out, “promised? who said i ever promised? i promise nothing—i shall 
make codicils as long as i like” (M, 124). fred receives this explicit 
warning that he should not expect to receive a bequest. Yet, instead of 
heeding this notice, he continues to believe what he wants to believe, 
ignoring featherstone’s clearly articulated intentions. in this case, as 
in so many others in the novel, fred simply assumes that the outer 
world correlates perfectly with his inner desires. 
mrs. Vincy’s ideas about fred’s entitlement to the property are 
similarly founded upon selfish desires rather than legitimate expecta-
tions. her understanding of promissory obligations has the ring of 
morality in it; it sounds like Paley’s definition of implied promises.40 
But mrs. Vincy’s expectations concerning fred’s inheritance have no 
more foundation than fred’s do. mrs. Vincy attempts to give moral 
weight to wishful thinking, transforming unwarranted expectations into 
binding obligations. here again, the novel highlights the tendency for 
people to see what they wish to see and to conflate their own desires 
with others’ intentions, complicating the practice of promising.41 
in the figure of mary garth, however, the novel holds out hope that 
promises—even implicit ones—can provide the basis for strong social 
ties. fred has loved the daughter of the kind and humble caleb garth 
ever since he was a child, and he desperately wishes to marry her. she 
tells him, though, that she will never do so if he becomes a clergyman, 
for she feels that he is singularly unsuited to that vocation. she makes 
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fred promise not to raise this subject with her again. Pressured by 
his father to enter the church, fred asks his friend and mentor, the 
reverend camden farebrother, to speak to mary for him and to try 
and determine whether he has any reason to hope that she will, in 
fact, marry him if he gives up the profession for which he has been 
educated. fred’s appeal places mr. farebrother in an awkward position, 
for he loves mary himself. she perceives his feelings for her when he 
implores her to tell him whether she could ever consider forming an 
attachment with someone other than fred. her reply is decisive:
i have too strong a feeling for fred to give him up for any one else. i 
should never be quite happy if i thought he was unhappy for the loss 
of me. it has taken such deep root in me—my gratitude to him for 
always loving me best, and minding so much if i hurt myself, from 
the time when we were very little. i cannot imagine any new feeling 
coming to make that weaker. i should like better than anything to 
see him worthy of every one’s respect. But please tell him i will not 
promise to marry him till then: i should shame and grieve my father 
and mother. he is free to choose some one else. (M, 486–87) 
mary here explicitly declares that she will not promise to marry fred 
until he makes himself worthy of others’ respect. in doing so, she 
raises his expectations that she will marry him if and when he earns 
that respect. as mr. garth puts it, mary “has given [fred] a sort of 
promise according to what he turns out” (M, 531). in mary’s relation-
ship with fred, then, eliot rewrites the plot of The Mill on the Floss. 
Unlike maggie, mary does not let her lover pressure her into forming 
an engagement when she is not ready to enter it; she sets the terms 
of their connection through her implied and conditional pledge.42 But 
she knows that she has raised fred’s expectations, and she is true to 
them. fred, in fact, relies upon her “sort of promise”; it inspires him 
to work hard and to avoid diversions such as hunting and gambling. 
mary becomes, as it were, his conscience—the “impartial spectator” 
within his breast.43 When fred thinks of her and of her opinion of 
him, he reins in his erring passion. mary’s conditional pledge thus af-
fects an important change in fred: it gives him a reason to consider 
someone’s perspective other than his own. at the end of the novel, 
when fred learns that his aunt has asked him to live at stone court 
and to manage the land there for her, he tells mary that he could be 
“a tremendously good fellow . . . and [they] could be married directly.” 
aware of fred’s failings, mary coyly replies, “not so fast sir; how do 
you know that i would not rather defer our marriage for some years? 
584 George Eliot and the Practice of Promising
that would leave you time to misbehave, and then if i liked some one 
else better, i should have an excuse for jilting you” (M, 778). there 
is, however, no real threat of such infidelity in this text. Unlike both 
maggie and Philip, and lucy and stephen, these lovers do indeed 
marry and achieve “a solid mutual happiness” (M, 779). 
iV.
in Daniel Deronda, eliot develops and extends this optimistic por-
trait of promising. as in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch, in 
this text, she expands the definition of promises to include all words 
and actions that, one knows, raise others’ expectations concerning 
the existence of binding obligations. through her willful heroine, 
gwendolen harleth, eliot holds out hope that even egoists can come 
to perceive the justice of this view of promising: gwendolen eventu-
ally acknowledges the importance of attending to others’ perspectives 
and accepts responsibility for breaking an implicit pledge. eliot’s most 
optimistic account of promising, though, appears in the novel’s Jewish 
plot. in daniel charisi’s relationship with Joseph Kalonymos and in 
the eponymous hero’s relationship with mordecai cohen, eliot affirms 
promises’ ability to provide continuity and stability in human relation-
ships, and suggests that promises can both reflect and promote a true 
meeting of minds. 
like eliot’s other headstrong heroines, gwendolen puts her own 
needs above everyone else’s. not surprisingly, she becomes fascinated 
by the wealthy and imperious henleigh grandcourt. Unbeknownst 
to gwendolen, though, grandcourt has already had an affair with a 
married woman, lydia glasher. the death of lydia’s husband, three 
years earlier, prompted in grandcourt “a vacillating notion of marrying 
her, in accordance with the understanding often expressed between 
them during the days of his first ardour.”44 however, grandcourt grew 
weary of her and refused to make her his wife. When lydia learns of 
gwendolen’s intimacy with grandcourt, she asks gwendolen to meet 
her in private. “i have promised to tell you something,” lydia explains 
when gwendolen arrives. “and you will promise to keep my secret”:
my name is lydia glasher. mr. grandcourt ought not to marry any 
one but me. i left my husband and child for him nine years ago. those 
two children are his, and we have two others—girls—who are older. 
my husband is dead now, and mr. grandcourt ought to marry me. he 
ought to make that boy his heir. (D, 189)
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although lydia insists that grandcourt “ought to marry [her],” she 
does not suggest that he promised to do so. she is more interested 
in securing a pledge from her rival than in establishing the existence 
of grandcourt’s own vow. horrified by the spectacle of this discarded 
mistress and her young children, gwendolen replies that she “will not 
interfere with [lydia’s] wishes” (D, 189). gwendolen leaves her mother 
and her uncle in offendene and travels to dover that afternoon to 
avoid further temptation from grandcourt. When mrs. harleth sends 
her word that her bank has failed and that she and her daughters are 
ruined, gwendolen rushes back to offendene, only to realize that she 
will need either to marry grandcourt or to become a governess in 
order to help support her mother and her young siblings.
at the center of the novel is the question of whether gwendolen 
is morally bound by a promise to lydia not to marry grandcourt. the 
question troubles gwendolen. When grandcourt sends her a letter, 
expressing his desire to see her again, she knows that a “moment of 
choice [has] come”:
[W]as it triumph she felt most or terror? impossible for gwendolen 
not to feel some triumph in a tribute to her power at a time when she 
was first tasting the bitterness of insignificance: again she seemed to 
be getting a sort of empire over her own life. But how to use it? here 
came the terror. Quick, quick, like pictures in a book beaten open with a 
sense of hurry, came back vividly, yet in fragments, all that she had gone 
through in relation to grandcourt—the allurements, the vacillations, 
the resolve to accede, the final repulsion; the incisive face of that dark-
eyed lady with the lovely boy: her own pledge (was it a pledge not to 
marry him?)—the new disbelief in the worth of men and things for 
which that scene of disclosure had become a symbol. (D, 337) 
overcome by conflicting feelings and desires, gwendolen at once 
acknowledges and questions her promise to lydia. gwendolen is 
similarly conflicted about her intentions concerning grandcourt. she 
“means” to refuse him and yet she gives him permission to visit her, 
knowing that, as her mother puts it, he “will consider that [she has] 
already accepted him, in allowing him to come” (D, 340). although 
gwendolen is willful and selfish, she is not completely immoral. she 
recoils from the idea of deliberately injuring anyone and has a “dread 
of wrongdoing, which,” the narrator explains, “was vague, it is true, 
and aloof from the daily details of her life, but not the less strong” 
(D, 342). gwendolen struggles to take hold of the situation in her 
mind:
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[d]id she know exactly what was the state of the case with regard to 
mrs. glasher and her children? she had given a sort of promise—had 
said, “i will not interfere with your wishes.” But would another woman 
who married grandcourt be in fact the decisive obstacle to her wishes, 
or be doing her and her boy any real injury? might it not be just as 
well, nay better, that grandcourt should marry? for what could not a 
woman do when she was married, if she knew how to assert herself? 
(D, 342)
gwendolen here briefly considers the moral obligation—the “sort of 
promise”—that she is under. she shows some concern for lydia’s wel-
fare; she pauses to think about whether her own marriage to grandcourt 
would injure lydia and her boy. But, unlike maggie tulliver and mary 
garth, gwendolen looks at the injury that would result from her breach 
only from her own perspective. lydia has already told gwendolen that 
she would feel deeply harmed if gwendolen marries the man who 
ought to become her husband; gwendolen substitutes her own ideas 
about the breach for lydia’s clearly articulated feelings.
as gwendolen continues to consider this question, she assumes 
a different perspective. this time, she considers what a hypothetical 
“‘anybody’ would say” (D, 342). this hypothetical “anybody,” however, 
proves to be very different from the “average or normal” person to 
whom philosophers and jurists alluded when deciding cases of ambigu-
ous promises and contracts.45 gwendolen’s “anybody” simply reflects 
back her own desires. in gwendolen’s view, “[t]he verdict of ‘anybody’ 
seem[s] to be that she had no reason to concern herself greatly on behalf 
of mrs. glasher and her children.” still, gwendolen intends to refuse 
grandcourt’s proposal, for she feels great “indignation and loathing that 
she should have been expected to unite herself with an outworn life, 
full of backward secrets” (D, 343). But “[a]lmost to her own astonish-
ment,” she feels a “sudden alarm at the image of grandcourt finally 
riding away”: “What would be left her then? nothing but the former 
dreariness. she liked him to be there” (D, 346). When he asks her 
to become his wife, she is unable to let him go. after a considerable 
pause, she accepts his proposal, the word “yes” coming “as gravely 
from [her] lips as if she had been answering to her name in a court of 
justice” (D, 348). the legal rhetoric here conveys the solemnity and 
certainty with which gwendolen responds to grandcourt’s proposal; 
eliot suggests that gwendolen knows what she is doing when she 
accepts this offer of marriage and knows that her decision will have 
serious moral consequences. the simile also suggests that gwendolen 
will be held accountable for her choice. eliot imagines gwendolen 
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answering to her name in a court of law at the very moment that she 
agrees to become mrs. grandcourt. the novel, in fact, hands down a 
verdict that differs sharply from the one that gwendolen hears in her 
own mind: eliot finds gwendolen to have broken a binding vow. 
Unlike mr. featherstone, who specifically tells his greedy nephew 
that he does not promise to leave him any property, but like maggie 
tulliver and mary garth, who knowingly raise their lovers’ hopes that 
they will marry no one but them, gwendolen is aware that she has 
led lydia to believe that she will refrain from marrying grandcourt. 
although gwendolen does not specifically use the word “promise” when 
she assures lydia that she will “not interfere” with her wishes, lydia 
herself uses the word twice at the beginning of their brief meeting, 
suggesting that she understands the statements that they will exchange 
to be similarly binding: “i have promised to tell you something. and 
you will promise to keep my secret,” she declares when gwendolen 
arrives. gwendolen agrees not to tell anyone about the meeting. 
When lydia prompts, “however you may decide, you will not tell mr. 
grandcourt, or any one else, that you have seen me?” gwendolen sig-
nificantly replies, “i promise” (D, 189). Unlike in maggie’s discussions 
with Philip, then, the language of promising permeates this encounter. 
gwendolen herself, as we have seen, initially feels constrained by the 
exchange; she considers herself under a “sort of promise,” even though 
she proceeds to wriggle out of it (D, 342).
in the poetic justice that the novel metes out, gwendolen suffers 
for breaking her word. at grandcourt’s request that lydia return a 
diamond necklace that he once gave her so that he may bestow it upon 
his wife, lydia tells him that she will send the diamonds directly to 
gwendolen. she encloses with them an angry and ominous note:
these diamonds, which were once given with ardent love to lydia 
glasher, she passes on to you. You have broken your word to her, that 
you might possess what was hers. Perhaps you think of being happy, as 
she once was, and of having beautiful children such as hers, who will 
thrust hers aside. god is too just for that. the man you have married 
has a withered heart. . . . You will have your punishment. (D, 406)
as lydia predicts, gwendolen does indeed “have [her] punishment” 
for breaking her word. fittingly, as gwendolen disregards lydia’s feel-
ings when she accepts grandcourt’s proposal, she soon finds herself 
married to a man who completely ignores her feelings. although dur-
ing their courtship, gwendolen thinks that grandcourt will be “less 
disagreeable as a husband than other men, and not likely to interfere 
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with [her] preferences,” he turns out to be even more willful and 
imperious than she is (D, 147). her determination to command him 
proves futile; grandcourt pays no heed to her wishes. in fact, early 
on in their marriage, he breaks “the first promise [he] made [her],” a 
promise never to bring his disturbing friend lush into her presence 
again (D, 626).
through gwendolen’s painful experience as well as through the 
relationship that she forms with the novel’s eponymous hero, she 
comes to understand the immorality of her action. as critics have long 
noted, deronda experiences a very different trajectory than gwen-
dolen does. deronda’s “conscience include[s] sensibilities beyond the 
common, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself imaginatively 
into the experience of others” (D, 570). deronda articulates eliot’s 
central message: “look on other lives besides your own,” he advises 
gwendolen. “see what their troubles are, and how they are borne. 
try to care about something in this vast world besides the gratification 
of small selfish desires” (D, 501–2). gwendolen eventually recognizes 
the value of this advice. through her conversations with deronda, 
she comes to understand the importance of trusting other people and 
respecting their feelings and desires. most significant, she admits that 
when she married grandcourt, she broke a promise to lydia. near 
the end of the novel, after her husband drowns in a boating accident 
for which she (wrongly) feels responsible, gwendolen admits her guilt 
to deronda in a scene that reads as if she were speaking under oath 
in a court of law:
i will tell you everything as god knows it. i will tell you no falsehood; 
i will tell you the exact truth. What should i do else? i used to think 
i could never be wicked. i thought of wicked people as if they were 
a long way off me. since then i have been wicked. i have felt wicked. 
and everything has been a punishment to me. . . . Because—you 
know—i ought not to have married. that was the beginning of it. i 
wronged some one else. i broke my promise. i meant to get pleasure 
for myself, and it all turned to misery. i wanted to make my gain out 
of another’s loss[.] (D, 757)46 
gwendolen assumes the posture of defendant here, acknowledging 
her culpability and accepting, as it were, a different verdict from the 
one that she imagines earlier in the novel. her candor and honesty 
now contrast with her previous carelessness about the words that she 
speaks and the impressions that she leaves upon other minds. she 
finally understands the importance of attending to other people’s 
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feelings and expectations, and recognizes the relationship between 
her desires and others’ pain.  
in the case of gwendolen’s broken pledge, then, eliot develops the 
idea that she introduces in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch. 
for eliot, as for Paley, austin, and sidgwick in her own day and for 
stanley cavell and Jan narveson in our own, there is no clear distinc-
tion between a statement of intention and a promise. statements of 
intention can raise expectations and thus create binding obligations 
just as explicit promises do.47 eliot embraces this expansive definition 
of promises because it straddles the internal and the external realms; 
it gives weight to others’ expectations—but only those expectations 
that one knowingly and voluntarily excites. through this theory of 
promising, eliot seeks to foster an awareness of the ways in which 
one’s words and actions affect other people.   
V.
although eliot suggests that, in cases of conflict, the reasonable 
expectations of promisees ought to take precedence over the actual 
intentions of promisors, in daniel charisi’s relationship with Joseph 
Kalonymos and in deronda’s relationship with mordecai, she affirms 
that promissory obligations ought, ideally, to be marked by mutual 
understanding and agreement. When people acknowledge and respect 
each others’ feelings and needs, the novel suggests, promises can create 
strong bonds, adding stability and continuity to relationships.48
the “solemn vow” that deronda’s grandfather, daniel charisi, ex-
changes with Joseph Kalonymos as a young boy creates precisely such 
a bond, at once reflecting and bolstering their friendship and loyalty to 
each other (D, 788). Kalonymos explains that he and charisi “solemnly 
pledged . . . to help and defend each other to the last.” although they 
remained apart in later years, he tells deronda, they never broke 
this bond. Kalonymos eventually “fulfil[s] [his] pledge” by passing on 
to deronda a chest containing charisi’s family records and religious 
writings (D, 791). the chest becomes a literal embodiment not only 
of the bond between the two friends but also of the link between the 
living and the dead. the promise thus works to dissolve the physical 
gulf between charisi and Kalonymos, while enabling charisi to convey 
his legacy to his grandson.
Promises serve to bolster the loyalty and friendship between deron-
da and mordecai, too. in fact, they play an even  greater role in this 
relationship than in that between charisi and Kalonymos. mordecai 
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admittedly overlooks deronda’s feelings and wishes when they initially 
meet, so absorbed is he in carrying out his own plans and goals. “You 
must be not only a hand to me, but a soul—believing my belief—be-
ing moved by my reasons—hoping my hope—seeing the vision i point 
to—beholding a glory where i behold it!” mordecai exclaims when he 
first sees deronda (D, 557). eliot emphasizes, however, that deronda 
chooses, of his own will, to embrace the role that mordecai assigns 
to him. after listening to and then participating in a debate about 
Jewish nationalism at the Philosophers’ club, deronda realizes that 
they share the same views on this question; only then does he begin 
to feel “at one with this man who ha[s] made a visionary selection of 
him” (D, 605). eliot further signals the importance of deronda’s assent 
to mordecai’s ideas through the handshakes that figure prominently 
in their encounters. at the end of their first meeting, after deronda 
assures mordecai that he will return at his first opportunity, deronda 
and mordecai shake hands. this pact becomes the model for their 
future encounters: their relationship builds around a series of implicit 
promises, sealed with handshakes, signaling their trust in and fidelity 
to each other.49 the promises underscore the importance of deronda’s 
consent; far from being a passive recipient of mordecai’s commands, 
deronda is an equal partner in the relationship. 
like gwendolen’s promise to lydia, deronda’s pledge to carry 
out mordecai’s work remains implicit. Yet, though deronda never 
uses the words, “i promise,” he makes it clear that he agrees with 
mordecai’s ideas and that he intends to devote his life to the cause of 
Zionism. after deronda discovers his own Jewish heritage, he explains 
to mordecai:
if this revelation had been made to me before i knew you . . . , i think 
my mind would have rebelled against it. Perhaps i should have felt 
then—“if i could have chosen, i would not have been a Jew.” What 
i feel now is—that my whole being is a consent to the fact. But it 
has been the gradual accord between your mind and mine which has 
brought about that full consent. . . . since i began to read and know, i 
have always longed for some ideal task, in which i might feel myself the 
heart and brain of a multitude—some social captainship, which would 
come to me as a duty, and not be striven for as a personal prize. You 
have raised the image of such a task for me—to bind our race together 
in spite of heresy. . . . i mean to work in your spirit. (D, 819–20)
this statement of deronda’s intended future action functions like a 
promise; the narrator explains that deronda’s “careful avoidance of pre-
mature assent” gives to this “decided pledge of himself a sacramental 
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solemnity, both for his own mind and mordecai’s” (D, 820). deronda 
refrains from promising that he will embrace all of mordecai’s ideas, 
reserving, in particular, the right to think further about the kabbalah’s 
doctrine of the merging of souls. “You must not ask me to promise 
that. . . . i must be convinced first of special reasons for it in the writ-
ings themselves,” deronda explains. “and i am too backward a pupil 
yet. that blent transmission must go on without any choice of ours; 
but what we can’t hinder must not make our rule for what we ought 
to choose” (D, 820–21). in his reply, mordecai signals his understand-
ing of deronda’s position and his recognition of the importance of 
deronda’s consent to this point. “i will ask for no promise till you see 
the reason,” he declares. “[Y]ou shall judge” (D, 821).50 they have, 
though, already reached an “accord” on other important points; both 
mordecai and deronda are committed to creating a separate Jewish 
nation, and deronda pledges to carry on mordecai’s work until he 
achieves this end. through her portrait of the promises that structure 
the relationship between these two men, eliot suggests the importance 
of a true meeting of minds.
not all late nineteenth-century thinkers shared eliot’s optimism 
about the ability of promises to connect individual consciousnesses and 
to provide stability and continuity in relationships. like ruskin and 
carlyle earlier in the century, the french sociologist emile durkheim 
viewed the growth of consensual agreements with chagrin. in The Divi-
sion of Labour (1893), he would emphasize the limits of “contractual 
solidarity” in modern society:
[i]f mutual interest draws men closer, it is never more than for a few 
moments. it can only create between them an external bond. in the 
fact of exchange the various agents involved remain apart from one 
another and once the operation is over, each one finds himself again 
“reassuming his self” in its entirety. the different consciousnesses are 
only superficially in contact: they neither inter-penetrate nor do they 
cleave closely to one another. indeed, if we look to the heart of the 
matter we shall see that every harmony of interests conceals a latent 
conflict, or one that is simply deferred. for where interest alone reigns, 
as nothing arises to check the egoisms confronting one another, each 
self finds itself in relation to the other on a war footing, and any truce 
in this perpetual antagonism cannot be of long duration. self-interest is, 
in fact, the least constant thing in the world. . . . thus such a cause can 
give rise only to transitory links and associations of a fleeting kind.51
this passage vividly conveys the selfishness and anomie that perme-
ate market society, while underscoring the ways in which contractual 
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exchanges foster these feelings of disconnection. deronda’s relation-
ship with mordecai provides a sharp contrast to this bleak picture of 
self-interested agreements. far from being locked in conflict, deronda 
and mordecai lovingly embrace each other; their consciousnesses inter-
penetrate, as they articulate and agree upon the same ideas and goals. 
the differences between eliot’s and durkheim’s portraits of consen-
sual agreements should not surprise us when we consider that, unlike 
durkheim, eliot depicts relationships that arise outside the realm of 
the market. eliot agrees with the jurists who consolidated classical 
contract law in this period insofar as she affirms the importance of a 
meeting of minds. Yet, unlike the jurists, who embraced the values 
of the marketplace and celebrated individual freedom even—and, in 
fact, precisely—when it resulted in unequal bargains, eliot endorses 
relationships that are founded upon real trust and consent. By contrast 
with the tenuous and self-interested ties that ruskin, carlyle, and 
durkheim perceive at the heart of commercial exchanges, and by 
contrast with the coercive bonds that eliot’s egoists attempt to impose 
on others in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch, the promises 
that bind deronda and mordecai are marked by mutual concern and 
respect. each person shares the other’s goals and values the other’s 
feelings and wishes. in the bond between these friends, eliot offers 
a utopian vision of the practice of promising.52
in eliot’s utopian vision, promises also serve as the basis for na-
tional communities. deronda and mordecai seek to bring together 
the Jewish people who are currently “scattered over the face of the 
globe” (D, 875) in order to give them a sense of “hearty kindred and 
fellowship” (D, 587). at the center of their vision lies a “national cov-
enant” (D, 591) that will bind “[the] race and its families in dutiful 
love” (D, 590). this covenant fuses the best aspects of pre-modern 
bonds with those of modern, contractual obligations. as in The Mill 
on the Floss, eliot emphasizes the importance of stability, cohesion, 
and kinship; but now she suggests that these goals can be achieved 
through voluntary ties.53    
eliot’s most hopeful and vivid portraits of promising, however, are 
limited in an important respect: they depict only pledges between 
men. for men alone—deeply sensitive and devout men, in particu-
lar—promises serve to reflect and promote a meeting of minds. the 
novel itself calls attention to the contrast between deronda’s bond 
with mordecai and his pledges to mirah and gwendolen. compared 
to deronda’s lengthy and passionate discussions with mordecai, his 
exchanges with mirah are brief and reserved. Whereas deronda and 
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mordecai openly share their feelings and aspirations, deronda remains 
emotionally distant from mirah, uncertain of her feelings for him. “say 
you will not reject me,” he implores her at last. “say you will promise 
to be my wife—say it now. i have been in doubt so long—i have had 
to hide my love so long” (D, 863). tellingly, we do not hear mirah’s 
reply, for she is not an equal partner to this contract. the promises that 
deronda exchanges with mordecai create a bond that does not threaten 
either of their separate identities. the veil that covers mirah’s face 
when she exchanges her “mutual pledge” with deronda, by contrast, 
calls attention to the way in which her identity becomes covered over 
and absorbed into that of her husband (D, 880). 
deronda’s pledge to mordecai similarly differs from his promise 
to gwendolen. after gwendolen confesses to deronda her guilty 
feelings about her husband’s death, deronda attempts to comfort 
her, prompting gwendolen to declare her need for and dependence 
upon him. “You must not forsake me,” she insists. “i will bear any 
penance. i will lead any life you tell me. But you must not forsake 
me. You must be near. if you had been near me—if i could have said 
everything to you, i should have been different. You will not forsake 
me?” gwendolen here attempts to impose a capacious obligation 
on deronda. he hedges his reply, indirectly expressing his desire to 
comply with her request: “it could never be my impulse to forsake 
you,” he assures her. deronda, of course, knows that he will not be 
able to remain near gwendolen much longer; he perceives that “to 
her ear his words might carry a promise which one day would seem 
unfulfilled: he was making an indefinite promise to an indefinite hope” 
(D, 765). still, deronda intends to honor his pledge. When he tells 
gwendolen of his imminent journey east, he explains, “We shall not 
be quite parted. . . . i will write to you always, when i can, and you 
will answer?” (D, 878). deronda’s promise never to forsake gwendo-
len—shored up by this additional, more specific pledge to write to 
her whenever he can—provides some security and stability in their 
relationship; it ensures that they will remain in contact in spite of the 
great distance that will separate them. 
this pledge, though, neither reflects nor promotes a meeting of 
deronda’s and gwendolen’s minds. eliot takes pains to emphasize the 
miscommunication that marks the making of the promise: deronda’s 
“voice, like his eyes,” we learn, “ha[s] the unintentional effect of mak-
ing his ready sympathy seem more personal and special than it really 
[is]” (D, 765). gwendolen, in short, reads more into this pledge than 
deronda intends. later on, when deronda tells gwendolen of his 
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imminent departure, he attempts to comfort her by suggesting that, 
through their correspondence, he will “be more with [her] than [he] 
used to be.” similarly, he holds out the hope that, though they may 
never see each other again, their “minds may get nearer” (D, 878). 
these possibilities, though, seem rather remote, given the disparate 
spheres that they occupy and the different lenses through which they 
view the world.54 Up until the final pages of the text, gwendolen, in 
fact, remains completely ignorant of the “separateness of [deronda’s] 
life” (D, 867). When she, at last, gains a glimpse of it, she experiences 
a profound change in perspective: she “feel[s] the pressure of a vast 
mysterious movement . . . and get[s] a sense that her horizon [is] but 
a dipping onward of an existence with which her own [is] revolving” 
(D, 876). Yet gwendolen’s mental world nonetheless remains distant 
from deronda’s. gwendolen possesses little knowledge of deronda’s 
feelings and needs; nor does she understand his intellectual and 
spiritual commitments. Unlike deronda’s pledge to mordecai, which 
reflects and promotes their shared ideas and goals, deronda’s promise 
to gwendolen does not foster real understanding between them. in 
this novel, eliot ultimately holds up a genuine accord as central to 
the practice of promising and yet suggests that such an accord is, in 
practice, limited to the minds of men.
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obligation, arguing for a return to the will theory. see fried, Contract as Promise: A 
Theory of Contractual Obligation (cambridge: harvard Univ. Press, 1981); and atiyah’s 
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and the Value of freedom,” in The Nature and Process of Law: An Introduction to 
Legal Philosophy, ed. Patricia smith (new York: oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 293–345. 
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(new York: d. appleton & co., 1865), 92–100, 164–66. the law of equal freedom is, 
for spencer, the ultimate ethical principle. Yet, while he celebrated the right of free 
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24 charles dickens, Our Mutual Friend, ed. Joel J. Brattin (J. m. dent: london, 
2000), 251. for a discussion of dickens’s treatment of contract in this novel, see simon 
Petch, “the sovereign self: identity and responsibility in Victorian england,” in Law 
and Literature, ed. michael freeman and andrew d. e. lewis (oxford: oxford Univ. 
Press, 1999), 405–10. 
25 see george eliot, George Eliot’s middlemarch Notebooks, ed. John clark Pratt 
and Victor a. neufeldt (Berkeley: Univ. of california Press, 1979), xlii, 202–7, 259–64. 
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milton, “inheritance as the Key to all mythologies: george eliot and legal Practice,” 
Mosaic 28 (1995): 49–68. 
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26 eliot owned a copy of austin’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, dated 1875, and she 
included excerpts from his writings in her notebooks. see eliot, Some George Eliot 
Notebooks, ed. William Baker, 4 vol. (salzburg: institut fur englische sprache und 
literatur, 1976–95), 1:198, 1:200, 1:303–4, 1:326. eliot became friends with sidgwick 
in the late 1860s and, in 1873, described him as “a chief favourite of [hers]” (quoted in 
“henry sidgwick,” Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, ed. John rignall [new 
York: oxford Univ. Press, 2000], 380–81). she also owned a copy of the first edition 
of his Methods of Ethics; the title page is inscribed, “With the author’s Kind regards” 
(William Baker, ed., The George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Library: An Annotated 
Catalogue of their Books at Dr. William’s Library [new York: garland, 1977], 186). 
on eliot’s knowledge of austin’s and sidgwick’s writings, see also lisa rodensky, The 
Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibility and the Victorian Novel (new York: oxford 
Univ. Press, 2003), 86–87, 95.
27 eliot, The Mill on the Floss, ed. gordon s. haight (Boston: houghton mifflin, 
1961), 236. hereafter abbreviated MF and cited parenthetically by page number.
28 in her recent study of the nature and role of sympathy in the Victorian marriage 
plot, ablow astutely situates these moral questions in the context of mid-century de-
bates about english marriage law. she draws connections between stephen’s claims and 
those of reformers who sought to ease restrictions on divorce, and between maggie’s 
understanding of marriage and that of conservatives who opposed the efforts to enable 
spouses freely to dissolve the conjugal tie. see ablow, 74–75.
29 for an overview of this broadly utilitarian approach to promising, see atiyah, 
Promises, Morals, Law, 29–34, 42–48.   
30 William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785; repr., new 
York: garland Publishing, 1978), 108. eliot owned a copy of Paley’s Moral Philosophy, 
with Additional Dissertations and Notes by Alexander Bain (edinburgh, W. & r. 
chambers, 1852). see The George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Library, 153. 
31 Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 108.
32 austin noted that “Paley’s rule would lead to this: that a mistaken apprehension of 
the apprehension in which the promisee received, would exonerate the promisor. this 
would be to disappoint the promisee” (Lectures on Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy 
of Positive Law, 4th ed., ed. robert campbell, 2 vol. [1879; repr., holmes Beach, 
fl: gaunt, 1998], 1:456 n.89). in his view, “[t]he true rule is the understanding of 
both parties” (1:456 n.89). for austin’s views of the nature of and justifications for 
promissory obligation, see also his The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. 
Wilfrid e. rumble (new York: cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 269–71, and Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, 2:939–40.    
33 henry sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (london: macmillan & co., 1874), 279. 
34 sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 285. 
35 craig discusses maggie’s ambiguous promise to Philip and similarly concludes that 
“[w]hatever [maggie] may have consciously intended concerning Philip, she is bound by 
the expectations and hopes raised in him by her behavior” (74). however, he does not 
situate this pledge in the context of changing philosophical ideas about promises or note 
eliot’s implicit agreement with utilitarian thinkers such as Paley, austin, and sidgwick. 
Vitek, by contrast, brings eliot’s novel into dialogue with sidgwick. see Vitek, 61–64, 
69–70. But Vitek is more interested in working out his own theory of promising than 
in offering a full analysis of eliot’s text. he insists that maggie’s “expression of love to 
Philip, though clearly raising his hopes, was not . . . a promise of engagement,” for she 
“pitied Philip more than she loved him” (Vitek, 232). Vitek objects to sidgwick’s idea 
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of a promise as “raised expectations” because it “relies on a conception of promissory 
obligation that seemingly gives the promisee the sole power to relieve a promisor of 
his or her obligation and hence ignores the relational features of promising” (69). as 
i argue below, although eliot privileges Philip’s expectations over maggie’s intentions, 
she recognizes and affirms the relational features of promising.   
36 see edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. conor cruise 
o’Brien (new York: Penguin, 1986), 192–93.    
37 see eliot, George Eliot’s middlemarch Notebooks, xlii, 202–7, 259–64. eliot and 
george henry lewes were friends with maine. maine, in fact, visited them while 
eliot was working on Middlemarch and asked about her progress on the novel. see 
eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. gordon s. haight, 9 vol. (new haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1955), 5:237.   
38 eliot, Middlemarch, ed. david carroll (new York: oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 21. 
hereafter abbreviated M and cited parenthetically by page number.
39 this pattern is first established when mr. Vincy tells rosamond that she must give 
up her engagement to lydgate and she implores, “Promise me, papa, that you will 
consent to what we wish” (Middlemarch, 332). the conversation ends with mr. Vincy 
implicitly doing just that. he tells her that lydgate must write to him before he can 
answer him; the narrator explains that rosamond feels “certain that she ha[s] gained 
her point” (Middlemarch, 333).
40 see Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 108. mrs. Vincy’s theory 
goes even further than Paley’s does; mrs. Vincy blurs the distinction between a prom-
ise and an outright gift. she suggests that because featherstone has raised her son’s 
expectations, featherstone’s property now belongs to fred and that featherstone, in 
fact, steals it from fred when he fails to leave it to him. in her mind, the property is 
already her son’s. 
41 in The Pickwick Papers (1836–1837), dickens takes up a similar question relating 
to the practice of promising, although he treats it in a much less serious way than eliot 
does. the comedy of the novel’s breach of promise trial turns on whether evidence such 
as a note that the amiable mr. Pickwick sends to his landlady mrs. Bardell, indicating his 
preferences for his evening meal, can be construed as an intention to wed the widow. 
the novel suggests that mrs. Bardell’s interpretation of the note is unwarranted and 
that her expectations are unfounded; it satirizes the jurors for finding mr. Pickwick 
guilty of breaching a promise to marry her. see dickens, The Posthumous Papers of 
the Pickwick Club, ed. robert l. Patten (new York: Penguin, 1972), 552–77. 
42 the narrator reminds us, on several occasions, that fred “espoused [mary] with 
[an] umbrella ring, when she wore socks and little strapped shoes” (Middlemarch, 
486; see also 217). although mary is grateful for fred’s early love for her, she does 
not let it overwhelm her better judgment now that she is of age. she substitutes this 
new provisional promise for her earlier unconditional pledge.
43 for adam smith’s discussion of the “impartial spectator,” see The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, ed. d. d. raphael and a. l. macfie (1759; repr., indianapolis: liberty fund, 
1982), 128–31. although fred returns to the gambling hall when mary leaves home to 
visit lowick Parsonage, mr. farebrother pulls fred aside and reminds him that mary 
“is only conditionally bound to [him]”; after this reminder, fred stays away from the 
hall and remains true to mary’s best opinion of him (eliot, Middlemarch, 635).
44 eliot, Daniel Deronda, ed. Barbara hardy (new York: Penguin, 1986), 386. here-
after abbreviated D and cited parenthetically by page number.
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45 regarding the interpretation of a contract, holmes explained, “[w]e ask, not 
what [the writer] meant, but what th[e] words would mean in the mouth of a normal 
speaker of english, using them in the circumstances in which they were used. . . . 
[t]he normal speaker of english is . . . external to the particular writer” (“the theory 
of legal interpretation,” Harvard Law Review 12 [1899]: 417–18). see also sidgwick, 
Methods of Ethics, 285.
46 for an insightful analysis of legal and moral questions raised by gwendolen’s failure 
to save her drowning husband, see rodensky, 160–70. rodensky examines the complex 
relationship between the inner, subjective realm—that of actual knowledge and inten-
tion—and the external, objective realm—that of actions and consequences from which 
knowledge and intention may be presumed—as it affects criminal responsibility. she 
traces a shift over the course of eliot’s novels “from the external to the internal, from 
the objective to the subjective in assessing accountability” (85).
47 like Paley, John austin, and sidgwick, philosophers such as stanley cavell and 
Jan narveson maintain that the essence of a promise is raised expectations, thus ac-
commodating a range of ways in which people make promises. see cavell, The Claim 
of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (oxford: clarendon Press, 
1979), 298; and narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns hopkins Univ. Press, 
1967), 185–200. speech act theorists such as J. l. austin and John r. searle, by con-
trast, emphasize the performative nature of promises. on this view, promises do things 
rather than assert things. hence speech act theory distinguishes between promises and 
statements of intention. although J. l. austin and searle acknowledge that statements 
of intention can create obligations in some circumstances, they do not consider such 
obligations to be promises. in specifying the context that must exist for the smooth or 
“happy” functioning of a promissory utterance, moreover, they give more weight to 
the actual intentions of promisors than cavell and narveson do. searle, for example, 
explains that the “essential condition” of a promise is that the speaker “intends that 
[his] utterance . . . will place him under an obligation to do [what he says that he will 
do]” (Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language [new York: cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1969], 60). see also J. l. austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., 
ed. J. o. Urmson and marina sbisà (cambridge: harvard Univ. Press, 1975), 1–11, 
14–17, 39–41, 69, 89, 151–52, 157–58. annette Baier similarly distinguishes between 
promises and other obligations such as “the commitment of a serious avowal of inten-
tion to another,” but she invokes hume’s account of promising in order to explain 
“the special force of the words ‘i promise’” (Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind 
and Morals [minneapolis: Univ. of minnesota Press, 1985], 197). for an overview of 
these different theories of promising, see atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law, 47–48, 
99–103, 165–69; and Vitek, 61–70.
48 hannah arendt articulates this hopeful view of promising in The Human Condition, 
2nd ed. (chicago: Univ. of chicago Press, 1998), 237, 243–44. in arendt’s words, bind-
ing oneself through promises “serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the 
future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone 
durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men” (237).
49 for some of these implicit promises, see eliot, Daniel Deronda, 564, 600, 603, 
638, and 816.
50 anderson, by contrast, perceives an underlying disagreement between mordecai 
and deronda. in her view, mordecai “does not believe that the merging of souls de-
pends upon reciprocal consent . . . . deronda avoids a direct clash by minimizing the 
ramifications of his refusal, but his equanimity masks a profound rejection of mordecai’s 
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disregard for his informed consent” (135). although Kucich—unlike anderson—takes 
the idea of intersubjective fusion that mordecai articulates to be eliot’s ideal, he argues 
that the novel repeatedly undermines this idea, and that eliot fails to offer “the truly 
social, interdependent vision she tried so hard to create” (181). for similar arguments 
concerning the limits of the sympathetic ideal in this novel, see cvetkovich, 128–64; 
garrett, 67–79; and Jaffe, 121–57.    
51 emile durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. W. d. halls (new 
York: the free Press, 1997), 152. durkheim argues that the division of labor itself 
provides the ties that hold people together in modern societies. 
52 on the utopian possibilities of contract that are evoked, although not realized, in 
nineteenth-century american fiction, see Brook thomas, American Literary Realism 
and the Failed Promise of Contract (Berkeley: Univ. of california Press, 1997), 286–88. 
thomas argues that the “interpersonal activity of promising” is crucial to the utopian 
possibilities of contract (18).
53 graver similarly argues that eliot combines features of pre-modern and modern 
societies in her portrait of the ideal community. see graver, 15–16, 24–25.
54 in Tradition, Counter Tradition: Love and the Form of Fiction (chicago: Univ. of 
chicago Press, 1987), 172–87, Joseph allan Boone insightfully discusses the ways in 
which the end of the novel calls attention to the different trajectories of gwendolen’s 
and deronda’s lives. 
